Resumo: O presente artigo analisa a composição étnico-racial dos programas de pós-graduação brasileiros da área de filosofia. O propósito é identificar as características gerais da área e analisar os dados disponíveis sobre as declarações de cor/raça em seus mestrados e doutorados. Espera-se que essas análises sejam úteis para a discussão e proposição de ações afirmativas em tais programas. O resultado obtido evidenciou que negros estão largamente sub-representados na pós-graduação em filosofia. Com efeito, a área é atualmente entre as humanidades a (...) de maior concentração de estudantes declarados brancos. Isto posto, o estudo especula possíveis causas e consequências dessa situação, procurando encontrar caminhos para o enfrentamento efetivo do racismo acadêmico. Palavras-chave: Desigualdades Raciais; Perfil Discente; Racismo Acadêmico. Black People in Philosophy Graduate Programs in Brazil Abstract: The present paper analyzes the ethnic-racial composition of Brazilian graduate programs in the field of philosophy. Its purpose is to identify the general characteristics of the field, and to analyze the available data on color/race in its master’s and doctoral programs. It is hoped that these analyzes will be useful for the discussion and proposition of affirmative actions in such programs. The result obtained showed that blacks are largely underrepresented in Brazilian philosophy graduate schools. Indeed, the field is currently the one with the highest concentration of students declared to be white among all the human sciences in Brazil. With that being said, the study speculates on possible causes and consequences of that situation, seeking to find ways to effectively confront academic racism. Keywords: Racial Inequalities; Student Profile; Academic Racism. Schwarze Menschen an Graduiertenprogrammen für Philosophie in Brasilien Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die ethnisch-rassische Zusammensetzung brasilianischer Graduiertenprogramme im Bereich Philosophie. Sein Zweck ist es, die allgemeinen Merkmale des Fachgebiets zu identifizieren und die verfügbaren Daten zu Farbe/Rasse in seinen Master- und Doktoratsprogrammen zu analysieren. Es ist zu hoffen, dass diese Analysen für die Diskussion und den Vorschlag von Maßnahmen positiver Diskriminierung in solchen Programmen nützlich sein werden. Das hier erreichte Ergebnis zeigte, dass Schwarze in den brasilianischen Graduiertenkollegs stark unterrepräsentiert sind. In der Tat ist das Fachgebiet derzeit dasjenige unter allen Humanwissenschaften in Brasilien mit der höchsten Konzentration von Studenten, die als weiß deklariert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund spekuliert diese Studie über mögliche Ursachen und Folgen dieser Situation und versucht, Wege zu finden, um akademischem Rassismus wirksam entgegenzutreten. Schlüsselwörter: Rassenungleichheiten; Studierendenprofil; Akademischer Rassismus. Data de registro: 16/06/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

O objetivo desta pesquisa é avaliar a presença de Arthur Schopenhauer como tema de dissertações de mestrado e teses de doutorado no Brasil. Essa avaliação é realizada a partir das respostas a quatro perguntas fundamentais: Em que localidades a Pesquisa Schopenhauer se concentra? Em quais níveis da pós-graduação stricto sensu ela ocorre? Quais áreas do conhecimento a produziram e a produzem? Quais são seus temas predominantes? A metodologia empregada é predominantemente quantitativa e consiste na análise dos dados de trabalhos registrados (...) no Catálogo de Teses e Dissertações da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior. (shrink)

In this treatise, al-Fārābī refers to mental acquisition of certain elementary principles of knowledge or cognitions that are the primary basis of any demonstrative process; and this means that cognitions, which are in our intellect, are independent of all experience. The innate character of cognitions is treated in his other works, as is their nature, e.g., whether they are content-ideas or dispositio.

Resumo: O psicanalista e teórico social Erich Fromm (1900-1980) alcançou fama mundial e foi largamente traduzido em nosso país nos anos sessenta e setenta do século passado, mas posteriormente encontram-se poucas referências às suas obras na literatura acadêmica brasileira. O objetivo do nosso texto não é expor a teoria de Fromm em seus múltiplos aspectos, mas retomar a sua crítica ao naturalismo freudiano, como uma forma de subsidiar a discussão contemporânea acerca do caráter universal ou etnocêntrico da interpretação psicanalítica do (...) mito edípico. Palavras-chave: Fromm; Complexo de Édipo; Freud Erich Fromm and the critique of the universality of the Oedipus Complex Abstract: The psychoanalyst and social theorist Erich Fromm (1900-1980) achieved worldwide fame and was widely translated in our country in the sixties and seventies of the last century, but later there are few references to his works in Brazilian academic literature. The objective of our text is not to expose Fromm's theory in its multiple aspects, but to resume his critique of Freudian naturalism, as a way to support the contemporary discussion about the universal or ethnocentric character of the psychoanalytic interpretation of the Oedipal myth Key-words: Fromm; Oedipus Complex; Freud Erich Fromm et la critique de l'universalité du complexe d'Œdipe Résumé: Le psychanalyste et théoricien social Erich Fromm (1900-1980) a acquis une renommée mondiale et a été largement traduit dans notre pays dans les années soixante et soixante-dix du siècle dernier, mais plus tard il y a peu de références à ses œuvres dans la littérature académique brésilienne. L'objectif de notre texte n'est pas d'exposer la théorie de Fromm dans ses multiples aspects, mais de résumer sa critique du naturalisme freudien, comme un moyen d'appuyer la discussion contemporaine sur le caractère universel ou ethnocentrique de l'interprétation psychanalytique du mythe œdipien. Mots-clés: Fromm; Complexe d'Œdipe; Freud Data de registro: 22/12/2022 Data de aceite: 23/08/2023. (shrink)

Entrevista com o professor Mauro Rêgo Sá Costa para o dossiê Rádio nas Bordas.

Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...) that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...) extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended. (shrink)

The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...) the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning. (shrink)

In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...) predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman's claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...) depth discussion about how to conceive perception. If we conceive the perceptual capacity disjunctively, even the weaker conclusion that we sometimes perceive sense-data does not hold. In response to Austin, Ayer claimed that the strong conclusion of the argument from illusion could be sustained by the method of the possibility of error. I argue that this method alone does not sustain that conclusion and the controversy turns back to the conflict between different conceptions of perception. The argument from illusion is philosophically interesting by putting in evidence the problem of how the perceptual capacity should be articulated and conceived. Although matters of fact are relevant to this question, they alone do not decide it. (shrink)

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...) says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...) epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.

In this paper, I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism concerning the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify (...) three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption, and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call 'Ecological Disjunctivism'. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and are supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the 'corresponding' hallucinations because the former results from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, ecological disjunctivism, since it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous than negative and positive disjunctivism. (shrink)

In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...) knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. (shrink)

O relato de experiência a que este texto se refere provém do módulo intitulado Violência no Espaço Escolar, do Curso de Extensão em Gênero, Raça e Diversidade Sexual/ODEERE. A partir de temas que envolvem raça/etnia, gênero, e sexualidades, foram promovidos debates relacionados a preconceitos e discriminações que se manifestam no espaço escolar voltados para o racismo, sexismo e à homo-lesbo-bi-transfobia. O desenvolvimento da proposta didática pautou-se na abordagem qualitativa à luz da dialética, com o intuito de problematizar incômodos prescritos pelo (...) poder hegemônico e de pensar alternativas de mudanças para a promoção de uma convivência respeitosa primando pela valorização das diferenças. Palavras-chave: Violência. Escola. Diferenças. (shrink)

Trata-se de um exercício de leitura da coreografia Night Journey (1947), de Martha Graham, como reinvenção do texto de Édipo rei (século IV a. C.), de Sófocles. Pretende-se esboçar um estudo em que se evidenciem os processos interartísticos entre literatura e dança.

The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how perceptual experience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that perceptual experience justifies non-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discuss this question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. (...) But I will defend that there is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even so the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I will assess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism. (shrink)

Con una belleza literaria incomparable, la Comedìa refleja la cosmovisión católica que vertebra la Cristiandad medieval, que tuvo su máximo exponente filosófico y teológico en santo Tomás. A lo largo de todo el itinerario poético, vemos la impronta del Aquinate presente en el meollo de la narración. Aquí analizaré cómo la cuestión teológica fundamental del gobierno divino del mundo permea la Comedìa, tanto en su estructura formal como en ciertos aspectos concretos del viaje de Dante. A partir de dicha premisa, (...) estudiaré las consecuencias que ello tiene en ese orden jurídico manifestado en la «arquitectura» del infierno, cuyo dintel es elocuente: «Giustizia mosse il mio alto fattore; / fecemi la divina podestate, / la somma sapienza e ‘l primo amore». Finalmente, abordaré la proporcionalidad de las penas que sufren los condenados, como indicador de la medida natural de los castigos dictados por justicia divina. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two dimensions in which the reclamation of slurs can succeed (or fail). By reclamation we refer to the linguistic practice whereby certain speakers employ slurs in order to express pride, foster camaraderie, manifest solidarity, subvert extant structures of discrimination, and so on. Reclamation can succeed, we propose, in at least two senses: in terms of felicity, insofar as a certain use of a slur counts as a move within a reclamatory practice; and in terms of (...) accomplishment, insofar as it achieves the goals typically associated with reclamation. In the first part, we present the distinction between felicity and accomplishment. In the second, we show that it provides a deeper understanding of the worries and concerns to which reclamation may give rise within and outside the academic debate. This distinction thus constitutes a valuable addition to the theoretical toolkit for analyzing the phenomenon of reclamation. (shrink)

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...) second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis--if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts--, and rejects the conjunction thesis--if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and (...) contend that Rodriguez-Pereyra's general defence of it fails. Then I defend the conjunction thesis from Rodriguez-Pereyra's case against it. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...) is then defended, by exploiting corresponding intuitions concerning statements involving their nominalizations, in an analogous manner. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

In recent years, some people have held that a radical relativist position is defensible in some philosophically interesting cases, including future contingents, predicates of personal taste, evaluative predicates in general, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions. The position is frequently characterized as denying that utterance-truth is absolute. I argue that this characterization is inappropriate, as it requires a metaphysical substantive contention with which moderate views as such need not be committed. Before this, I also offer a more basic, admittedly less exciting (...) alternative characterization of the position, in terms of departing from the Kaplan–Lewis–Stalnaker two-dimensional framework. (shrink)

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...) the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Relativism and Apparent Faultless Disagreement The Many Relativisms: Moderate vs. Radical Moderate Relativisms: Indexical vs. Non ‐ indexical Contextualism Radical Relativism: Content vs. Truth Relativism The Many “Relativism”s References.

The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays (...) attention to such a distinction. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...) 'is a knife,' 'is a bachelor,' or 'is funny.' In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that "unnatural" properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded. (shrink)

Contiene tres trabajos sobre Arturo Ardao: sobre la noción de sujeto (Yamandú Acosta); sobre la interpretación de Andrés Bello (Arturo A. Roig); y sobre su libro Filosofía de lengua española (ver HLAS 36:5047). Mencionamos algunas de las otras contribuciones: el tema de la historia de la filosofía latinoamericana (Horacio Cerutti Guldberg); el batllismo (Manuel A. Claps); el tema de Calibán (Roberto Fernández Retamar); el pensamiento de Pedro Figari (Juan Fló); la universidad latinoamericana en el siglo XVIII (Gregorio Weinberg); (...) el pensamiento socialista en el Uruguay (Carlos Zubillaga). Es de lamentar que no se agregara al volumen una bibliografía de Ardao"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)

According to relativism, these appearances of faultless disagreement are to be endorsed. According to moderate relativism, this can be done within the general Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker two-dimensional framework, in which the basic semantic notion is that of a sentence s being true at a context c at the index i: it may in effect be the case that s is true at c but false at c∗. According to indexical relativism, this is so in virtue of the content of sentence s at (...) c being different from that of s at c∗. (shrink)